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The Twilight of Comity
SPENCER WEBER WALLER*
This article analyzes one of the most contentious issues
over the past fifty years in international economic
law-the extent to which a nation may apply its law on
an extraterritorial basis and the limits, if any, posed by
the doctrine of international comity. This article,
based on Professor Waller's paper presented at the
1999 Wolfgang Friedmann conference, examines the
reasons why the doctrine of international comity once
represented the primary battleground for conflict over
the extent of permissible extraterritoriality in United
States antitrust law but no longer represents the
forefront of current thought on this important issue.
The article argues that the retrenchment of United
States enforcement policy in foreign commerce
antitrust cases, the diminution of comity in private
antitrust cases, the failure of United States courts to
apply comity during its heyday on a coherent and
principled basis, the spread of extraterritoriality to
foreign competition systems, the rise of more practical
concerns in foreign commerce antitrust cases, and the
emergence of new issues relating to competition law in
transition economies and the potential role of the
World Trade Organization in the competition field all
contributed to the demise of comity as a controversial
issue. This article concludes that the proponents of a
broad role for international comity achieved a partial,
but important, victory that laid the groundwork for the
future agenda of the international competition law and
policy community.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. With thanks to the
participants of the 1999 Friedmann conference and Lawrence Solan for their thoughtful
comments and to Nonna Gushchina and Robert Berry for their research assistance.
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Over the course of my lifetime, two generations of legal
academics and policy makers have debated endlessly the desirability
and parameters of the doctrine of international comity as a means to
temper the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law.
Comity as a doctrine of limitation was first proposed as the
"jurisdictional rule of reason" by Kingman Brewster.' The doctrine
of international comity reached its high point in 1976 when the Ninth
Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America declared that a
comity analysis was required before exercising jurisdiction to
prescribe under the Sherman Act.' Since then, comity has remained
the darling of the majority of academic commentators, but has
received an ambivalent reception in the courts and uniform rejection
from American legislators.'
The United States Supreme Court in 1993 dealt comity a near
death blow in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California4 by limiting
comity considerations in most situations to those conflicts where one
sovereign has compelled the very conduct which the other sovereign
forbids. This pronouncement, along with the treatment of comity by
1. KiNGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446
(1958).
2. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
3. The United States Congress has never required the consideration of comity in the
exercise ofjurisdiction under any aspect of the antitrust laws despite numerous opportunities
to do so. Moreover, the Congress has enacted numerous pieces of legislation operating on an
extraterritorial basis without any incorporation of comity considerations. The most
prominent example in recent years has been the Helms-Burton Act imposing sanctions on
firms anywhere in the world which do business in Cuba or traffic in United States assets
which were expropriated without compensation by the Castro regime. See Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91).
4. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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the lower courts following Haryford Fire, suggests that comity as a
legal doctrine in the courts has seen better days and will rarely be
successful in dismissing antitrust litigation brought either by the
United States government or by private plaintiffs.5
This article examines six of the factors leading to the twilight
of comity. They are:
1. the retrenchment of United States government
enforcement policy in foreign commerce antitrust cases;
2. the diminution of the legal significance of comity in
private antitrust cases;
3. the utter failure of the United States courts to apply a
comity analysis in a consistent manner based on record
evidence as opposed to vague rhetoric claims;
4. the eclipse of comity by other more practical litigation
concerns in foreign commerce antitrust litigation;
5. the acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction by other
leading competition enforcers outside of the United States;
and
6. the emergence of new concerns that have captured the
imagination of the competition law and policy community.
Despite these developments, the concept of comity should not
be undervalued. It played a particularly important role in restraining
the worst excesses of United States post-war antitrust imperialism. It
also represented one of the finest theoretical constructs in thinking
about how international law affects, and constrains, the reach of
national regulatory statutes.
At one level, comity is no longer important because its
advocates won. The United States government now acts cautiously,
and considers foreign interests before it seeks to investigate or
challenge conduct abroad by foreign nationals that allegedly produces
anticompetitive effects in the United States. At another level, the
advocates of comity lost because neither the United States
government nor courts in private antitrust litigation are required to
engage in a comity interest balancing analysis before proceeding in a
foreign commerce case.
In a final sense, it has ceased to matter. Comity was the
burning issue of the day for nearly fifty years while the United States
5. See, e.g., Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom, 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 685 (1998); Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways PLC, 972 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
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was the world's antitrust policeman and U.S. national law sought to
regulate nearly alone most anticompetitive conduct in foreign and
global markets. Now we stand poised on the brink of a new world in
which dozens of jurisdictions police their own markets for
anticompetitive conduct and abusive market structures and the United
States debates with its trading partners the creation of truly global
rules to police global markets. Traditional comity concerns have little
role to play in this debate.
This does not mean the fight was not worth it. It just means
that it is time to let go of one set of historically contingent issues that
reflected one era, prepare for the debates of the new era upon us, and
say goodnight to an old friend.
I. FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO EMBRACE A VERSION OF
COMITY
As late as 1982, it was necessary for government attorneys to
plead their case that they really did consider comity before bringing
matters under the federal antitrust laws.6 Today it is clear that both
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
routinely consider comity factors in the exercise of their prosecutorial
discretion. Comity has been part of the published international
antitrust guidelines in all three versions since 1977 with both the FTC
and the Antitrust Division as authors of the most recent 1995
Guidelines in the area.7
These guidelines moreover appear to reflect the actual practice
of both agencies. The Justice Department as early as 1978 indicted
only a United States corporation in the Uranium grand jury
investigation and choose not to proceed against the foreign targets as
a result of the careful consideration of the position of the affected
foreign governments.' Similarly, the Justice Department did not bring
6. See William C. Holmes, Government Antitrust Actions and Remedies Involving
Foreign Commerce: Procedural and Substantive Limitations, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 105,
121-22 (1982).
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.2 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter
1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 5 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter
1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST
GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7 (Jan. 26, 1977).
8. See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., Crim. No. 78-123 (W.D. Pa. filed May 9,
1978). The case was terminated by a plea of nolo contendre and an agreed fine of $40,000.
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criminal indictments in the Laker Airways investigation as a result of
foreign policy and other comity considerations.9
The FTC had fewer opportunities to enforce the antitrust laws
via the effects doctrine but appears to have heeded the requirements
of comity in the vast majority of its civil enforcement actions and
many merger decisions. In the dozens of high profile merger
decisions taken by the FTC, the agency has given few grounds for
offense based on comity. The most glaring omission in recent times
perhaps has been the FTC's decision in the Merieux merger
investigation to impose a remedy in a consent decree requiring
divestiture of assets in Canada without apparently consulting with, or
even informing, the Canadian authorities in advance."° Fortunately,
even this omission did not create much of an international incident
and had the helpful effect of highlighting to the FTC how important
consultation and consideration of comity factors were for subsequent
matters.
Perhaps the best proof that the enforcement agencies have
learned the comity lesson is found in the recent flurry of criminal
grand jury investigations by the Justice Department of international
cartel activity and a similar flurry of international merger
investigations by both the Justice Department and the FTC. Dozens
of criminal and civil investigations and enforcement actions have
produced only one serious, on the record assertion that the United
States has failed to adequately consider the issue of comity in its
enforcement decisions."
At the same time, the enforcement agencies have tried to have
it both ways with respect to comity. While pledging to take comity
fully into account in its enforcement decisions, the Antitrust Division,
and now the FTC, contend in the 1988 and 1995 International
Guidelines that comity has no role to play once the agencies have
decided to take action in the international arena." This attitude is one
of arrogance and is wrong, particularly for the adjudication of liability
under the antitrust laws of the United States, which has been
9. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 19, 1984) (press release) (announcing the termination
on foreign policy grounds of grand jury investigation into passenger air travel between the
United States and Great Britain).
10. See Institut Merieux, 55 Fed. Reg. 38854 (1990); Deborah Owen & John Parisi,
International Mergers and Joint Ventures: A Federal Trade Commission Perspective, 1990
FORDHAM CoMP. L. INST. 1, 5-7.
11. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for The Government of Japan at 7-19, United States v.
Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001).
12. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES at § 3.2; 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES at
§ 5.0 n. 171.
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committed by statute to the courts for resolution. 13  As Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld so aptly notes, it treats an issue of law as if it
were an issue of politics. 4 As yet, this issue remains unlitigated. This
issue is likely to remain a theoretical, rather than a practical, concern
since the government does a good job in considering comity factors
and a defendant would be hard pressed to convince the court that the
government had botched this job.
This still poses the challenge to the United States government
to demonstrate the relative weight of the national interests at stake in
the actions it brings, and not merely to assert that the predominance of
our interests is shown by the fact it brought suit. The government
should welcome this burden since it does such an excellent job in
considering comity factors in the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion. There is the further challenge to the government in private
antitrust suits to participate and express the interests of the United
States at the earliest possible point in the litigation, except in those
limited circumstances where such participation would jeopardize
important economic, political, or foreign policy interests of the United
States. In both cases, a court should give substantial weight to the
government's position, but in no case excuse the government from
making its showing or excuse itself from the obligation to decide the
issue on the merits.
If. THE RISE AND FALL OF CoMITY iN PRiVATE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
Since the 1970s, the rise and fall of comity has been centered
in the area of private antitrust litigation. The need for comity in this
context arose primarily because private litigants otherwise lacked the
incentive to consider the broader national interest in deciding whether
to bring treble damages or injunctive actions against foreign
defendants.'" It was a private antitrust case, Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank ofAmerica,16 which required a comity test for the assertion of
13. See Joseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation,
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 381-84 (1994).
14. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of
Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42,
52 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Int'l Assoc. Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affid, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (dismissing of private antitrust seeking injunction
against alleged antitrust violations in pricing and sales of petroleum in world markets).
16. 549 F.2d 59, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, relying on the
jurisdictional rule of reason set forth in Kingman Brewster's classic
treatise Antitrust and American Business Abroad.17  Since
Timberlane, the doctrine has developed through a handful of
decisions in the lower courts and through academic commentary and
the work of the American Law Institute.18 In the absence of direct
Supreme Court precedent, the courts and commentators endlessly
debated whether comity was an appropriate, required, or optional
aspect of the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and precisely
what factors should be included in the analysis. 9
Just when it appeared that comity had entrenched itself in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court virtually eliminated it as a
meaningful restraint on the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act. The Supreme Court finally dealt directly with the issue of
comity in its 1993 opinion in Hartford Fire." The Supreme Court
held, by a 5-4 margin, that a defendant must demonstrate a "true
conflict" before the court would balance any conflict between foreign
interests and policies against those of the United States." l The
majority only accepted as a true conflict those rare situations where
the foreign government actually required what United States law
forbade.2" While the Supreme Court hedged its bets as to whether any
other aspect of the Timberlane comity analysis could be used without
a showing of such foreign compulsion, 3 the majority of subsequent
lower court decisions have taken the Supreme Court at its word and
severely restricted the role of comity where a direct substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce has been
shown.24
17. See BREWSTER, supra note 1.
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965). See generally JAMES R. ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER & SPENCER WEBER
WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusiNEss ABROAD § 6 (3d ed. 1997).
19. A search of the Law Review library of LEXIS on April 20, 1999 indicated more
than 330 articles since 1980 containing the words "extraterritoriality" and "comity." This
search dramatically understates the volume of commentary since the database does not
contain books, monographs, older material, and omits certain American law reviews and
most foreign law reviews.
20. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
21. Id. at 798-99.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Spencer Weber Waller, From the Ashes of Hartford Fire: The Unanswered
Questions of Comity, in 1998 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 33.
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III. NEVER GETTING COMITY RIGHT
Even if a full comity interest balancing approach was the best
approach from a theoretical perspective, the United States courts have
proved incapable of applying such a test in a consistent and principled
manner. Typically U.S. courts have either given great offense to
foreign nations by ignoring or denigrating their legitimate interests or
they have uncritically deferred to the assertion of allegedly important
foreign interests. In neither case has there been any serious attempt to
construct an evidentiary record.
For example, the courts in the International Uranium Antitrust
Litigation gave great and unnecessary offense to the affected foreign
governments in a private treble damage action against foreign
uranium producers. The district court initially granted default
judgments against the foreign defendants, rejecting any requirement
of a comity-based balancing of interests test.25 The Seventh Circuit
added fuel to the fire in upholding the default judgments and
excoriating the foreign governments for "subserviently" acting as
"surrogates" for the defaulters."
More frequently, the problem has been the mirror image issue
of courts not holding defendants to their burden of proof. This has
been the case both before and after Hartford Fire.
The district court's opinion in Rivendell Forest Products27 was
particularly disappointing in the way the court uncritically deferred to
Canadian interests. The district court in Rivendell concluded that
Canada's interests in the regulation of its lumber industry outweighed
those of the United States in enforcing its antitrust laws on the basis
of a scanty record without the benefit of significant discovery. In
essence, the court found that the existence of an on-going trade
dispute between the U.S. and Canada involving that industry made
jurisdiction inappropriate, even though the antitrust dispute was not
directly connected to the trade dispute.28
In Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, the plaintiff sued a
publicly owned French telecommunication company for
monopolizing markets for the sale of subscriber information.29 The
25. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
26. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980).
27. Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Prods., Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 1116 (D.
Colo. 1993).
28. Id. at 1119-20.
29. 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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district court had no difficulty holding that subject matter jurisdiction
was present as a result of the direct, substantial and foreseeable
effects of the defendant's conduct in the United States.30
Judge Haight then addressed whether Hartford Fire changed
the application of Timberlane.31 In light of the language of Hartford
Fire and the subsequent holdings on comity within the Second
Circuit, Judge Haight concluded that "a party seeking the dismissal of
a Sherman Act case on the ground of international comity must first
demonstrate that a true conflict exists between the Sherman Act and
relevant foreign law."132  He then concluded that only once that
threshold of a true conflict was passed, would the court examine the
familiar Timberlane factors.33
Judge Haight believed it to be a question of first impression
how to determine whether or not a true conflict existed within the
meaning of Hartford Fire.34 He then held that it was sufficient that
French law may require what the Sherman Act may forbid and then
proceeded to undertake the full comity balancing of interests analysis
under Timberlane.35  The court held "that France Telecom's
substantial claim, consistently asserted in France and not yet finally
adjudicated there," was sufficient to support dismissal as a true
conflict between the policies of the United States and France.36 Judge
Haight also concluded without further elaboration that the other
Timberlane factors favored dismissal as well.37
Both the reasoning and the result of Filetech were particularly
disappointing. 38  While neither survived appellate review, 39 Filetech
30. Id. at 483.
31. He also considered whether the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act required
any change in the Timberlane analysis but concluded that it did not. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1999).
See id. at 479.
32. 978 F. Supp. at 478.
33. See id.
34. In Hartford Fire, the parties agreed that no such conflict was present. See 509 U.S.
at 798. In Maxwell Communications Corp. v. Barclays Bank, the parties agreed that there
was such a conflict. Maxwell Commun. Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Commun.
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
35. 978 F. Supp. at 478-79.
36. Id. at 480. In addition to being questionable antitrust law, Judge Haight's decision
appears to ignore and contravene the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1,
which govern proof of foreign law. FED. R- CIv. P 44(l).
37. 978 F. Supp. at481.
38. Judge Haight struggled with the concept of comity in another prominent foreign
commerce antitrust case. See Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Board, 954 F. Supp
733 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reh'ggranted, 942 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
39. In Filetech, the Second Circuit reversed in a pointed rebuke to the district court.
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best illustrates how often district courts mangle both Timberlane and
Hartford Fire beyond recognition.
This is unfortunately representative of what comity has
become in the U.S. courts. The federal judiciary, as a result of the
background and experiences of the typical judge, and the infrequency
and difficulty of foreign commerce antitrust cases, has little chance of
success. Whether the problem is too little or too much sensitivity to
foreign concerns, one can rarely point to a case in which the degree of
deference and the extent of reasoned elaboration was arguably just
right.
40
IV. WHY EXTRATERRJTORIALITY AND COMITY MATTERS LESS
THAN You WOULD THINK
Both advocates and critics have always overestimated the
practical importance of extraterritoriality and the accompanying
restraint of comity. As any litigator quickly realizes,
extraterritoriality is only the beginning of a long and tortuous path
that culminates when any judgment or injunction is fully satisfied.
Along this path lie many hurdles including service of process, venue,
personal jurisdiction, motion practice, myriad discovery disputes,
creating a persuasive record at trial, surviving appellate review, and
enforcing any resulting judgment. In addition, many private antitrust
cases have been deterred or defeated by substantive changes in the
antitrust laws that have replaced per se antitrust offenses with a more
daunting rule of reason analysis and imposed more stringent rules of
standing, antitrust injury, and direct purchaser requirements.4 In
most foreign commerce antitrust cases, these hurdles far exceed the
question of whether the United States courts have jurisdiction to
prescribe anticompetitive conduct done abroad by foreign nationals.
The Second Circuit not only questioned the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the first
place, it also held in the alternative that the district court had done precisely what Hary'ord
Fire forbids in proceeding to a comity analysis before making the necessary findings about
the existence of a true conflict. 157 F.3d at 932.
40. Even Timberlane itself was hardly a success in that the Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed the dismissal of the case on comity grounds nearly a decade after the district court
had originally dismissed the case based on a lack of effects on the United States market. See
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 574 F. Supp.
1453, (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985). Cf Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(analyzing why
United States court should be not be required to perform comity analysis).
41. See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S.
ANTrrUST LAW §§ 1-4 (1998).
[38:563
THE TWILIGHT OF COMITY
For example, personal jurisdiction has frustrated periodic
attempts to enforce the United States antitrust laws against the
DeBeers diamond syndicate.42 Even when portions of the DeBeers
empire have come within the personal jurisdiction of the United
States courts, other more prosaic concerns have defeated enforcement
efforts as in the case of the recent unsuccessful prosecution of
General Electric Corporation, DeBeers, and several individual foreign
defendants. The indictment alleged an international cartel m
industrial diamonds between United States, European and other
producers and distributors. The indictment alleged that much of the
alleged conduct took place in Europe. Prosecutors believed that much
of the evidence also was located in Europe, but were almost entirely
unsuccessful in obtaining access to documents or witnesses located
outside the United States.43 The lack of ability to obtain evidence was
probably outcome determinative in that the United States trial court
dismissed all charges against the American defendant, specifically
citing the inability of the government to obtain more complete
evidence from abroad.'
The United States government has learned from these lessons.
In recent times both the Antitrust Division and the FTC have spent far
more time negotiating cooperation agreements with foreign
enforcement agencies and working with those agencies to discover
the necessary evidence to obtain convictions and effective relief and
very little time worrying about unilateral assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, with or without comity.45
42. See, e.g., United States v. DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd., 1948-49 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
43. United States v. General Electric Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
While this case undoubtedly was the subject of discussions between the Antitrust Division
and EU Commission, the only publicly known assistance came from the Belgian national
police, who searched the files of one of the alleged conspirators. See also JOEL I. KLEIN, A
NoTE OF CAUTION WITH RESPECT TO WTO AGENDA ON COMPETITION POLICY, ADDRESS AT
THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, (Nov. 18, 1996), reprinted at 1996 WL
666205; William M. Carley, Fatal Flaws: How the Federal Case Against GE, De Beers
Collapsed So Quickly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1994, at Al.
44. General Electric, 869 F. Supp. at 1300.
45. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U. L. REv. 376 (1998).
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V. OTHER COUNTRIES JoIN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST
GAME
Comity was a cause c6l bre when the United States stood
alone as the sole extraterritorial enforcer of competition law and
enforcement was at its most aggressive. Today, the United States has
pledged to carefully consider comity in an ever expanding series of
bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with antitrust cooperation
and many other nations apply versions of extraterritoriality
themselves.46 The European Union applies its own version of
extraterritoriality, using slightly different terminology.47 Germany
has statutory authority to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction in its
national competition law.48 A host of other nations have applied their
competition law on an extraterritorial basis regardless of the position
they take when the United States applies its laws to their citizens.49
The current attitudes toward extraterritoriality are best
exemplified in the merger area. At present more than 50 countries
have antitrust regimes with merger provisions. Most of these
countries have some form of either voluntary or mandatory premerger
notification. 0 As a result most major transnational mergers or
acquisitions end up filing for antitrust review in multiple jurisdictions,
including many countries in which they have little or no actual
operations or sales."1 The current record appears to be the Exxon-
Mobil merger, which may ultimately involve the filing of up to 40
46. See generally id.
47. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116-17 & 125-29/85, A. AhIstrom Osakeyhito Oy
v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (holding that EU competition law applies as long as
anticompetitive activity implemented within EU); Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd.
v. Comm'n, 1972 E.C.R. 619 (discussing the expansive use of parental responsibility for
anticompetitive activities by subsidiaries within EU). Most recently, the majority of EU use
of extraterritoriality has come in the area of merger control. See generally Andre Fiebig, The
Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger Control Regulation, 5 COLUM. J. EuR.
L. 79 (1998/99).
48. § 130 (2) Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen (GWB) v. 26.8.1998 (BGBI I
S. 2546) [Statute against non-competitive behavior], reprinted at <http://
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/part~v.html> (english translation).
49. Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing in Transnational
Litigation, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925, 960-62 (1991).
50. For a survey of the principal jurisdictions with merger control regimes see J.
WILLIAM ROWLEY & DONALD I. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST
PROCESS (2d ed. 1996 & Supp.)
51. For a series of case studies of these types of transactions, see ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MERGERS CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A
STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994).
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premerger notifications in different jurisdictions.52 In some of these
transactions, the various competition agencies have cooperated with
each other, and on occasion, deferred to each other's judgment and
exercised restraint, if not true comity, in structuring remedies when a
violation is found under one or more systems. 3
The 1990s multiple jurisdiction merger review game is more
often applied by a variety of non-U.S. competition authorities aimed
at American firms. While occasionally controversial,54 there is
substantial convergence in actual practice with the United States and
its foreign counterparts meeting somewhere in the middle, agreeing
on the need to police foreign transactions for their competitive impact
in one's own market. At the same time the antitrust authorities are
searching for ways not to impose undue burdens on the private parties
or to interfere with the important national interests of other
governments where the firms are headquartered or do business.
While the bar and policy makers work to streamline or
harmonize this bewildering array of procedural and substantive
requirements, it is clear that the rest of the world has caught up to the
United States in the areas of extraterritoriality and the need for
comity.55 What is fascinating is that most commentators either view
the current overlapping international merger regulation system, based
on effects and/or trivial presence in a market, as a mere transaction
cost that can be reduced through greater coordination.56 Few, if any,
characterize this any longer as a controversial principle of
international law.
VI. WHAT MATTERS TODAY
Most contemporary commentators and policy makers are not
particularly concerned about either extraterritoriality or comity. They
accept both principles as inextricably linked facts of life that have to
be dealt with in terms of individual cases or investigations, but not as
52. William E. Kovacic, Can Exxon Mobilize? (visited Apr. 13, 1999)
<http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/opencourt/stories/A516-1999Apr6.html>.
53. See Hearings Before the Panel on Information Sharing and Procedural
Harmonization of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, November 3,
1998, (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/2232-b.htm> [hereinafter
ICPA C Hearings].
54. U.S. is Concerned Over EU Opposition to Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
Consolidation, 73 ANTLTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 43 (1997).
55. See ICPAC Hearings, supra note 53.
56. See id.
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big picture issues driving the international antitrust agenda. The
evolution of the mainstream antitrust agenda in the international area
can be gleaned from three blue ribbon panels that were convened at
different times in the United States to examine antitrust issues.
Extraterritoriality was a significant part of the international
section of the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. 7 Extraterritoriality was the
first and primary of the three international topics dealt with in the
report with the Committee ultimately recommending that the Sherman
Act only apply to conduct abroad by foreign nationals that produced
substantial anticompetitive effects in the United States. 8
The agenda of the 1979 National Commission for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and procedures similarly emphasized the concerns
of its era.59 The 1979 National Commission was charged with
examining the increasing complexity of antitrust litigation and the
scope of antitrust exemptions.6" The only international topic that the
1979 Commission dealt with was the scope of the export exemption
to the antitrust laws.6 At a time of increasing concern over the export
competitiveness of the United States, the Commission split over
whether the Webb-Pomerene Act exempting certain export
associations should be abolished, limited, or expanded.6"
Today's agenda for the United States is being debated in the
The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC)
of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice.
ICPAC consists of representatives of law, industry, and academia,
63
57. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS (Mar. 31, 1955).
58. See id. at 76. The report also dealt with whether the substantive standards of the
Sherman Act should be different for foreign commerce cases and certain defense and export
exemptions. See id. at 80-91 & 108-114.
59. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEw OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (Jan. 22, 1979).
60. See id. at 320.
61. Seeid. at295-316.
62. See id. at 295, 302-04. See also id. at 393-401(Separate Statement of
Commissioner Javits). It should be noted that the Commission's work was followed shortly
by extensive Congressional Hearings culminating in the passage of both the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act and the Export Trading Company Act, which eased the
application of antitrust laws to export activity. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1999); Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1991).
63. For a description of ICPAC's members and executive director, see INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, (visited Apr. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/icpac/icpac3.htm>.
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formed to "address the global antitrust problems of the 21st
Century." 64
Although ICPAC's agenda is broad, extraterritoriality and
comity are not a major part of the issues under consideration. ICPAC
has been asked to consider three distinct but related topics: 1) The
Interface of International Trade and Competition Policy; 2)
Multijurisdictional Merger Review; and 3) Enforcement
Cooperation.65 Lengthy hearings have been conducted on these topics
and formal papers have been solicited addressing many different
facets of these topics. 66 Few of these topics have much to do with
either extraterritoriality or comity and little time has been spent on
these issues at the hearings themselves.67 While ICPAC's final report
remains unwritten, there is little reason to believe that
extraterritoriality or comity will be a major topic of interest.
A quick survey of the principal fora for the development of
competition policy outside of the United States shows a somewhat
broader agenda than ICPAC, but again little attention to the
traditional aspects of extraterritoriality and comity. The European
Union ("EU") has focused its efforts on bilateral and multilateral
cooperation and the development of competition policy in the new
market economies of the Central and Eastern European countries.68 In
addition, the EU is on record for supporting the use of the WTO to
develop and enforce multilateral competition rules for the world
trading system.69
64. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, (visited Apr. 9,
1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm>.
65. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REQUEST FOR INPUT,
(visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/1981.htm>. ICPAC has excluded the
relationship of antitrust principles and specific trade remedies such as dumping from its
consideration. See id.
66. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REQUEST FOR
PAPERS, (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/I982new.htm>.
67. ICPAC is considering the role of so-called positive comity. Positive comity is a
relatively recent series of provisions in antitrust cooperation agreements in which one country
initially requests its partner to take action against a person in the requested country's territory
in lieu of using its own laws on an extraterritorial basis. See Agreement on the Application
of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, June 4, 1998,
U.S.-E.U., 37 I.L.M. 1070 (1998). Properly understood, positive comity is more closely
related to the issues of enforcement cooperation that ICPAC is studying rather than the
classical issues of comity, now sometimes referred to as negative comity.
68. The mission of the international section of Directorate General IV of the European
Commission can be found at EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL IV,
COMPETITION, INTERNATIONAL-OVERVIEW, (visited Apr. 12, 1999)
<http://europa.eu.intlcommldg04/intemaloverview.htm>.
69. See Commission Proposes Building World Competition Instrument, European
Commission Press Release, IP (96)523 (June 18, 1996), reprinted at
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") is the primary multilateral organization with
an active competition policy agenda. The OECD is currently focused
on the relationship between trade and competition, devising better
procedures for the multijurisdictional review of mergers and
acquisitions, promoting enforcement cooperation, and the
development of limited core principles of antitrust banning so-called
hard cartels.7" The remaining organizations that deal with
competition policy are all either focused on regional problems or are
at too preliminary a stage of their work to chart their future course of
action.7' None as yet have focused on comity as anything other than a
small part of the quotidian task of antitrust enforcement in a world
economy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The twilight of comity is upon us because the war has long
since been fought to a draw. The United States government uses
extraterritoriality sparingly and uses comity extensively, at least as a
matter of prosecutorial discretion. Private parties use
extraterritoriality more frequently, and courts use comity in these
cases more sparingly, all with the blessing of the United States
Supreme Court. More practical litigation concerns restrain aggressive
plaintiffs who would otherwise jeopardize the interests of the United
States in favor of private gain. Foreign governments use
extraterritoriality more frequently than ever before, taking the sting
out of their occasional complaints about its misuse in the United
States. In the absence of a vertical hierarchical method of
international law-making, one could not hope for a much improved
outcome.
<http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/welcome.htm>; Competition Policy in the New Trade
Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules from the Group of Experts of the
Commission of the European Communities, COM(95)359 final, reprinted at
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgO4/intema/en/strengh.pdf>.
70. A representative idea of the OECD's current and recent work can be found in the
publications section of the OECD website which can be accessed at OECD, FINANCE,
INVESTMENT, TAXATION AND COMPETITION, (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/
daf/clp/index.htm>.
71. For example, the competition policy group of the Free Trade of the Americas
negotiations had only its third meeting in May of 1999. See FTAA, COMPETITION POLICY,
(visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/ngcomp-e.asp>. The work of
competition policy group of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is at an even more
preliminary stage. See APEC, ACITIEs BY GROUPS: COMPETITION POLICY, (last modified
Mar. 4, 1999) <http://www.apecsec.org.sgcommittee/competition.html>.
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The stage is set for a different generation of issues to come to
the fore. There will be great attention in the foreseeable future on
problems such as: advising new regimes on the creation of their own
competition policies, negotiating regional trading arrangements with
competition components, creating and enforcing bilateral and
multilateral cooperation agreements, and resolving the controversy
over whether the world needs, or is ready for, true international
antitrust rules.
These issues will undoubtedly prove just as contentious as
extraterritoriality and comity, and they are just as important. In the
end, we have merely arrived at new aspects of the familiar and
important problem of how fairly to apply national competition laws to
international markets and whether there is a better way.

